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Abstract
We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational
complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the net-
work complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical
impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approx-
imately e3cient and approximately budget-balanced. Our results show that one important and
natural case of multicast cost sharing is an example of a canonical hard problem in distributed,
algorithmic mechanism design; in this sense, they represent progress toward the development of
a complexity theory of Internet computation.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the standard unicast model of Internet transmission, each packet is sent to a single
destination. Although unicast service has great utility and widespread applicability, it
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cannot e3ciently transmit popular content, such as movies or concerts, to a large
number of receivers; the source would have to transmit a separate copy of the content
to each receiver independently. The multicast model of Internet transmission relieves
this problem by setting up a shared delivery tree spanning all the receivers; packets
sent down this tree are replicated at branch points so that no more than one copy of
each packet traverses each link. Multicast thus greatly reduces the transmission costs
involved in reaching large user populations.
The large-scale, high-bandwidth multicast transmissions required for movies and
other potential sources of revenue are likely to incur substantial transmission costs.
The costs when using the unicast transmission model are separable in that the total
cost of the transmission is merely the sum of the costs of transmission to each receiver.
Multicast’s use of a shared delivery tree greatly reduces the overall transmission costs,
but, because the total cost is now a submodular and nonlinear function of the set of
receivers, it is not clear how to share the costs among the receivers. A recent series of
papers has addressed the problem of cost sharing for Internet multicast transmissions. In
the Brst paper on the topic, Herzog et al. [13] considered axiomatic and implementation
aspects of the problem. Subsequently, Moulin and Shenker [24] studied the problem
from a purely economic point of view. Several more recent papers [7,2,1,10] adopt
the distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) approach, which augments a
game-theoretic perspective with distributed computational concerns. In this paper, we
extend the results of Feigenbaum et al. [7] by considering a more general computa-
tional model and approximate solutions. We also extend a classic impossibility [12]
result by showing that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately e3cient
and approximately budget-balanced.
Before providing a detailed technical statement of our results, we introduce DAMD
and our model of multicast cost sharing.
1.1. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design
We consider both complexity and incentive issues inherent in multicast cost sharing.
This approach is fairly new, as incentives have rarely been an important consideration
in traditional theoretical computer science (TCS). Instead, users (or the computers act-
ing on their behalf) are assumed either to be obedient (i.e., to follow the prescribed
algorithm) or to be adversaries who “play against” each other. The traditional TCS
focus is on the design of computationally e3cient algorithms and protocols that ac-
complish the desired aim in the presence of these obedient or adversarial users.
In contrast, the sel;sh users in game theory are neither cooperative nor adversarial.
Although one cannot assume that selBsh users will obediently follow the prescribed
algorithm, one can assume that they will respond to incentives. Thus, one need not
design algorithms that achieve correct results in the face of adversarial behavior on the
part of some users, but one does need algorithms that work correctly in the presence
of predictably selBsh behavior by all users. Achieving system-wide goals like Pareto
e3ciency or fairness in the presence of selBsh agents is the primary aim of economic
mechanism design (see [16] for a review). However, this mechanism-design literature
has not typically considered the algorithmic e3ciency of mechanisms.
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Thus, while the economics literature traditionally stressed incentives and downplayed
computational complexity, the computer-science literature traditionally did the opposite.
The emergence of the Internet as a standard platform for distributed computation has
changed this state of aJairs. Incentives have become an increasingly important con-
sideration in network-protocol design (see, for example, [9,11,15,18,19,30–32]). More
recently, the work of Nisan and Ronen [26] has inspired the design of algorithmic
mechanisms for, e.g., scheduling, load balancing, lowest-cost paths, and combinatorial
auctions that satisfy both the traditional economic deBnitions of incentive compati-
bility and the traditional TCS deBnitions of e3ciency. The examples of algorithmic
mechanism design in [26] use centralized computations and therefore invoke notions
of centralized complexity. More recent papers have introduced DAMD, in which the
computations are distributed and therefore require distributed measures of complexity.
Feigenbaum et al. [7] propose a general concept of “network complexity” that requires
a distributed algorithm executed over an interconnection network T to be modest in
four respects: the total number of messages that agents send over T , the maximum
number of messages sent over any one link in T , the maximum size of a message,
and the local computational burden on agents. If a distributed algorithm requires an
excessive expenditure of any one of these four resources, then its “network complex-
ity” is unacceptable. This notion of network complexity allows the mechanism designer
to evaluate the feasibility of executing the algorithmic mechanism in a decentralized
setting. Network complexity is not (yet) a precisely deBned notion, and further study
of distributed algorithmic mechanisms is required to formalize its deBnition. Each of
these four resources has been used as a measure of complexity in the distributed com-
putation literature; however, it is not standard to consider all four resource constraints
simultaneously.
A central challenge in the study of algorithmic mechanism design is the search
for hard problems and, more generally, the development of a full-Kedged “complexity
theory” of mechanisms. SuperBcially, a problem is hard if it cannot be solved in a
manner that satisBes both the incentive-compatibility and the computational-tractability
requirements. There will be many problems for which this cannot be done; NP-hard
problems, for example, cannot be solved in a computationally tractable manner (unless
P=NP), and there are no e3cient, strategyproof, and budget-balanced solutions to gen-
eral cost-sharing problems. However, we are not interested in hardness per se but rather
in hardness that results from the interplay of incentive compatibility and computational
complexity. Thus, a more useful distinction is made by deBning a DAMD problem
to be a canonical hard problem 5 if each of these two requirements can be satisBed
individually, but they cannot be satisBed simultaneously. Canonical hard problems will
help us understand the fundamental nature of hardness in DAMD, as opposed to hard-
ness that results solely from computational issues or solely from incentive issues. When
combined with earlier work in, e.g., [24,7], the results that we present here show that
one important and natural case of multicast cost sharing is a canonical hard problem; to
the best of our knowledge, it is the Brst such example in the literature. Like “network
5 In the extended abstract of this paper [6], these were called “representative hard problems”. Here, we
use the term “canonical hard problem” in order to be consistent with the DAMD survey paper [8].
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complexity,” “canonical hardness” is not (yet) a precisely deBned notion; ultimately,
one would like to have well-deBned network complexity classes, one or more natural
notions of reduction, and canonical hard problems that are complete for some class,
but more natural examples of good (and bad) distributed algorithmic mechanisms are
needed in order to get to that point. Further discussion of easiness and hardness in
DAMD can be found in [8].
1.2. Multicast cost sharing model
We use the multicast-transmission model of Feigenbaum et al. [7]: There is a user
population P residing at a set of network nodes N , which are connected by bidirectional
network links L. The multicast Kow emanates from a source node s ∈N ; given any set
of receivers R⊆P, the transmission Kows through a multicast tree T (R)⊆L rooted at
s and spans the nodes at which users in R reside. It is assumed that there is a universal
tree T (P) and that, for each subset R⊆P, the multicast tree T (R) is merely the minimal
subtree of T (P) required to reach the elements in R. This approach is consistent with
the design philosophy embedded in essentially all multicast-routing proposals (see, e.g.,
[3,4,14,28]).
Each link l∈L has an associated cost c(l)¿0 that is known by the nodes on each
end, and each user i assigns a utility value ui to receiving the transmission. Note
that ui is known only to user i a priori, and hence user i can strategize by reporting
any value vi¿0 in place of ui. A cost-sharing mechanism determines which users re-
ceive the multicast transmission and how much each receiver is charged. We let xi¿0
denote how much user i is charged and i denote whether user i receives the trans-
mission; i=1 if the user receives the multicast transmission, and i=0 otherwise.
We use u to denote the input vector (u1; u2; : : : ; u|P|). The mechanism M is then a
pair of functions M (u)=(x(u); (u)). The practical feasibility of deploying the mech-
anism on the Internet depends on the network complexity of computing the functions
x(u) and (u). It is important to note that both the inputs and outputs of these func-
tions are distributed throughout the network; that is, each user inputs his ui from his
network location, and the outputs xi(u) and i(u) must be delivered to him at that
location.
The receiver set for a given input vector is R(u)={i|i=1}. A user’s individual
welfare is given by wi=iui− xi. The cost of the tree T (R) reaching a set of receivers
R is c(T (R)), and the overall welfare, or net worth, is NW (R)=uR − c(T (R)), where
uR =
∑
i∈R ui and c(T (R))=
∑
l∈T (R) c(l). The overall welfare measures the total
beneBt of providing the multicast transmission (the sum of the utilities minus the total
cost).
Our goal is to explore the relationship between incentives and computational com-
plexity, but, before we do so, we Brst comment on several aspects of the model. The
cost model we employ is a poor reKection of reality, in that transmission costs are
not per-link; current network-pricing schemes typically only involve usage-based or
Kat-rate access fees, and the true underlying costs of network usage, though hard to
determine, involve small incremental costs (i.e., sending additional packets is essen-
tially free) and large Bxed costs (i.e., installing a link is expensive). However, we are
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not aware of a well-validated alternative cost model, and the per-link cost structure is
intuitively appealing, relatively tractable, and widely used (e.g., in [2,1,10,7,17,21]).
We assume that the total transmission costs are shared among the receivers. There
are certainly cases in which the costs would more naturally be borne by the source
(e.g., broadcasting an infomercial) or the sharing of costs is not relevant (e.g., a tele-
conference among participants from the same organization); in such cases, our model
would not apply. However, we think that there will be many cases, particularly those
involving the widespread dissemination of popular content, in which the costs would
be borne by the receivers.
There are certainly cases, such as the high-bandwidth broadcast of a long-lived event
such as a concert or movie, in which the bandwidth required by the transmission is
much greater than that required by a centralized cost-sharing mechanism (i.e., sending
all the link costs and utility values to a central site at which the receiver set and cost
shares could be computed). For these cases, our feasibility concerns would be moot.
However, Internet protocols are designed to be general-purpose; what we address here
is the design of a protocol that would share multicast costs for a wide variety of uses,
not just long-lived and high-bandwidth events. Thus, the fact that there are scenarios
(e.g., the transmission of a shuttle mission, as explained below) in which our feasibility
concerns are relevant is su3cient motivation; they need not be relevant in all scenarios.
In comparing the bandwidth required for transmission to the bandwidth required for
the cost-sharing mechanism, one must consider several factors. First, and most obvious,
is the transmission rate b of the application. For large multicast groups, it will be quite
likely that there will be at least one user connected to the Internet by a slow modem.
Because the multicast rate must be chosen to accommodate the slowest user, one cannot
assume that b will be large. Second, the bandwidth consumed on any particular link by
centralized cost-sharing mechanisms scales linearly with the number of users p= |P|,
but the multicast’s usage of the link is independent of the number of users. Third, one
must consider the time increment  over which the cost accounting is done. For some
events, such as a movie, it would be appropriate to calculate the cost shares once (at
the beginning of the transmission) and not allow users to join after the transmission
has started. For other events, such as the transmission of a shuttle mission, users would
come and go during the course of the transmission. To share costs accurately in such
cases, the time increment  must be fairly short. The accounting bandwidth on a single
link scales roughly as p, which must be compared to the bandwidth Nb used over
a single accounting interval. Although small multicast groups with large  and b
could easily use a centralized mechanism, large multicast groups with small  and b
could not.
We have assumed that budget-balanced cost sharing, where the sum of the charges
exactly covers the total incurred cost, is the goal of the charging mechanism. If the
charging mechanism were being designed by a monopoly network operator, then one
might expect the goal to be maximizing revenue. There have been some recent inves-
tigations of revenue-maximizing charging schemes for multicast (see, e.g., [10]), but
here we assume, as in [13,24,7,2,1], that the charging mechanism is decided by society
at large (e.g., through standards bodies) or through competition. Competing network
providers could not charge more than their real costs (or otherwise their prices would
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be undercut) nor less than their real costs (or else they would lose money), and so
budget balance is a reasonable goal in such a case. For some applications, such as
big-budget movies, the bandwidth costs will be insigniBcant compared to the cost of
the content, and then diJerent charging schemes will be needed, but for low-budget or
free content (e.g., teleconferences) budget-balanced cost-sharing is appropriate.
Lastly, in our model it is the users who are selBsh. The routers (represented by tree
nodes), links, and other network-infrastructure components are obedient. Thus, the cost-
sharing algorithm does not know the individual utilities ui, and so users could lie about
them, but once they report them to the network infrastructure (e.g., by sending them
to the nearest router or accounting node), the algorithms for computing x(u) and (u)
can be reliably executed by the network. Ours is the simplest possible strategic model
for the distributed algorithmic mechanism-design problem of multicast cost sharing,
but, even in this simplest case, determining the inherent network complexity of the
problem is nontrivial. Alternative strategic models (e.g., ones in which the routers
are selBsh, and their strategic goals may be aligned or at odds with those of their
resident users) may also present interesting distributed algorithmic mechanism-design
challenges. Preliminary work along these lines is reported in [21]. Finally, we note that
our framework of DAMD includes both distributed information (inputs and outputs) and
distributed computation; there has also been work on studying the impact of distributed
information alone on algorithmic mechanism design [22,27].
1.3. Statement of results
In order to state our results more precisely, we need additional notation and termi-
nology.
A strategyproof cost-sharing mechanism is one that satisBes the property that wi
(u)¿wi(u|ii), for all u, i, and i. (Here, (u|ii)j=uj, for j = i, and (u|ii)i=i. In
other words, u|ii is the utility proBle obtained by replacing ui by i in u.) Strate-
gyproofness does not preclude the possibility of a group of users colluding to improve
their individual welfares. Any reported utility proBle v can be considered a group strat-
egy for any group S ⊇{i | vi = ui}. A mechanism M is group-strategyproof (GSP) if
there is no group strategy such that at least one member of the strategizing group
improves his welfare while the rest of the members do not reduce their welfare. In
other words, if M is GSP, the following property holds for all u; v, and S ⊇{i|ui = vi}:
either wi(v) = wi(u); ∀i ∈ S;
or ∃i ∈ S such that wi(v) ¡ wi(u):
In general, we only consider mechanisms that satisfy four natural requirements: 6
No positive transfers (NPT): xi(u)¿0; in other words, the mechanism cannot pay
receivers to receive the transmission.
6 The one exception is Section 4, in which we do not assume SYM; that section contains an impossibility
result, and so not making this assumption only makes the section stronger.
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Voluntary participation (VP): wi(u)¿0; this implies that users are not charged if
they do not receive the transmission and that users who do receive the transmission
are not charged more than their reported utilities.
Consumer sovereignty (CS): For given T (P) 7 and link costs c(·), there exists some
cs such that i(u)=1 if ui¿cs; this condition ensures that the network cannot exclude
any agent who is willing to pay a su3ciently large amount, regardless of other agents’
utilities.
Symmetry 8 (SYM): If i and j are at the same node or are at diJerent nodes
separated by a zero-cost path, and ui=uj, then i = j and xi=xj.
In addition to these basic requirements, there are certain other desirable properties
that one could expect a cost-sharing mechanism to possess. A cost-sharing mechanism
is said to be e>cient if it maximizes the overall welfare, and it is said to be budget-
balanced if the revenue raised from the receivers covers the cost of the transmission
exactly. It is a classical result in game theory [12] that a strategyproof cost-sharing
mechanism that satisBes NPT, VP, and CS cannot be both budget-balanced and e3cient.
Moulin and Shenker [24] have shown that there is only one strategyproof, e3cient
mechanism, called marginal cost (MC), deBned in Section 4 below, that satisBes NPT,
VP, and CS. They have also shown that, while there are many GSP, budget-balanced
mechanisms that satisfy NPT, VP, and CS, the most natural one to consider is the
Shapley value (SH), deBned in Section 2 below, because it minimizes the worst-case
e3ciency loss.
Both MC and SH also satisfy the SYM property. The egalitarian (EG) mechanism
of Dutta and Ray [5] is another well studied GSP, budget-balanced mechanism that
satisBes the four basic requirements. Jain and Vazirani [17] present a novel family
of GSP, approximately budget-balanced mechanisms 9 that satisfy NPT, VP, and CS.
Each mechanism in the family is deBned by its underlying cost-sharing function, and
the resulting mechanism satisBes the SYM property whenever the underlying function
satisBes it. We use the notation JV to refer to the members of the Jain–Vazirani family
that satisfy SYM.
It is noted in [7] that, for multicast cost sharing, both MC and SH are polynomial-
time computable by centralized algorithms. Furthermore, there is a distributed algorithm
given in [7] that computes MC using only two short messages per link and two simple
calculations per node. By contrast, [7] notes that the obvious algorithm that computes
SH requires (|P| · |N |) messages in the worst case and shows that, for a restricted
class of algorithms (called “linear distributed algorithms”), there is an inBnite set of
instances with |P|=O(|N |) that require (|N |2) messages. Jain and Vazirani [17] give
centralized, polynomial-time algorithms to compute the approximately budget-balanced
mechanisms in the class JV.
7 For brevity, we often use T (P) to denote four components of a multicast cost-sharing problem instance:
the node-set N , the link-set L, the locations of the agents, and the multicast-source location s.
8 This straightforward deBnition is less restrictive than the one given by Moulin and Shenker [24]. The
SH, JV, and EG mechanisms that we use as examples satisfy the more stringent deBnition of symmetry in
[24] as well.
9 The mechanisms in [17] actually satisfy a more stringent deBnition of approximate budget balance than
we use; thus, our network-complexity lower bounds apply to them a fortiori.
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In this paper, we show that:
• Any distributed algorithm, deterministic or randomized, that computes a budget-
balanced, GSP multicast cost-sharing mechanism must send (|P|) bits over linearly
many links in the worst case. This lower bound applies, in particular, to the SH and
EG mechanisms.
• Any distributed algorithm, deterministic or randomized, that computes an approx-
imately budget-balanced, GSP multicast cost-sharing mechanism must send (log
(|P|)) bits over linearly many links in the worst case. This lower bound applies, in
particular, to the SH, EG, and JV mechanisms.
(In both these results, the “worst case” is worst with respect to all possible network
topologies, link costs, and user utilities.)
In order to prove the Brst of these lower bounds (i.e., the one for exact budget bal-
ance), we Brst prove a lower bound that holds for all mechanisms that correspond to
strictly cross-monotonic cost-sharing functions. Cross-monotonicity, a technical prop-
erty deBned precisely in Section 2, means roughly that the cost share attributed to
any particular receiver cannot increase as the receiver set grows; the SH and EG
cost-sharing functions for a broad class of multicast trees are examples of strictly
cross-monotonic functions but not the only examples. Our lower bound on the network
complexity of strictly cross-monotonic mechanisms may be applicable to problems other
than multicast.
It is well known that there is no strategyproof mechanism that is both (exactly)
e3cient and budget-balanced on all problem instances [12]. This in itself does not
rule out the existence of a strategyproof mechanism that is approximately e3cient and
approximately budget-balanced. However, we prove that this is also impossible:
• There is no strategyproof multicast cost-sharing mechanism satisfying NPT, VP, and
CS that is both approximately e3cient and approximately budget-balanced.
2. Exact submodular cost sharing
In this section, we prove a basic communication-complexity lower bound that applies
to the distributed computation of many submodular cost-sharing mechanisms. We Brst
prove this lower bound for all mechanisms that satisfy “strict cross-monotonicity” as
well as the four basic properties discussed in Section 1. We then show that, when-
ever the underlying cost function is strictly subadditive, the resulting Shapley-value
mechanism (SH) is strictly cross-monotonic and hence has poor network complexity.
Finally, we discuss the special case of multicast cost sharing and describe very general
conditions under which the multicast cost will be strictly subadditive. In particular, we
present an inBnite family of instances that have strictly subadditive costs and show that,
on these instances, any cost-sharing mechanism that satisBes the four basic requirements
is equivalent to SH and must have poor network complexity.
Consider the general situation in which we want a mechanism to allow the users to
share the cost of a common service. We restrict our attention to the case of binary
preferences: User i is either “included”, by which he attains utility ui, or he is “ex-
cluded” from the service, giving him 0 utility. A mechanism can use the utility vector
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u as input to compute a set R(u) of users who receive the service and a payment
vector x(u). Further, suppose that the cost of serving a set S ⊆P of the users is given
by C(S). This cost function is called submodular if, for all S; T ⊆P, it satisBes:
C(S ∪ T ) + C(S ∩ T )6 C(S) + C(T ):
Submodularity is often used to model economies of scale, in which the marginal costs
decrease as the serviced set grows. One example of a submodular cost function is the
one presented in Section 1, where the cost of delivering a multicast to a set R of
receivers is the sum of the link costs in the smallest subtree of the universal tree that
includes all locations of users in R.
Moulin and Shenker [23,24] have shown that any mechanism for submodular cost
sharing that satisBes budget-balance, GSP, VP, and NPT must belong to the class of
cross-monotonic cost-sharing mechanisms. A mechanism in this class is completely
characterized by its set of cost-sharing functions g={gi : 2P→R¿0}. Here gi(S) is
the cost that g attributes to user i if the receiver set is S. For brevity, we will refer
to g={gi} as a “cost-sharing function”, rather than a set of cost-sharing functions.
We say that g is cross-monotonic if, ∀i∈ S; ∀T ⊆P, gi(S ∪T )6gi(S). In addition, we
require that gi(S)¿0 and, ∀j =∈ S; gj(S)=0. Then, the corresponding cross-monotonic
mechanism Mg=((u); x(u)) is deBned as follows: The receiver set R(u) is the unique
largest set S for which gi(S)6ui, for all i. This is well deBned, because, if sets S and
T each satisfy this property, then cross-monotonicity implies that S ∪T satisBes it. The
cost shares are then set at xi(u)=gi(R(u)).
There is a natural iterative algorithm to compute a cross-monotonic cost-sharing
mechanism [24,7]: Start by assuming the receiver set R0=P, and compute the resulting
cost shares x0i =gi(R
0). Then drop out any user j such that uj¡x0j ; call the set of
remaining users R1. The cost shares of other users may have increased, and so we
need to compute the new cost shares x1i =gi(R
1) and iterate. This process ultimately
converges, terminating with the receiver set R(u) and the Bnal cost shares xi(u).
Now, we consider a subclass of the cross-monotonic mechanisms:
Denition 1. A cross-monotonic cost-sharing function g={gi : 2P→R¿0} is called
strictly cross-monotonic if, for all S ⊂P; i∈ S; and j =∈ S, gi(S ∪{j})¡gi(S). The cor-
responding mechanism Mg is called a strictly cross-monotonic mechanism.
We now prove a lower bound on the communication complexity of strictly cross-
monotonic cost-sharing mechanisms. Our proof is a reduction from the set disjoint-
ness problem: Consider a network consisting of two nodes A and B, separated by
a link l (see Fig. 1). Node A has a set S1⊆{1; 2; : : : ; r}, node B has another set
S2⊆{1; 2; : : : ; r}, and one must determine whether the sets S1 and S2 are disjoint. It is
known that any deterministic or randomized algorithm to solve this problem must send
(r) bits between A and B. (Proofs of this and other basic results in communication
complexity can be found in [20].)
Theorem 1. Suppose Mg is a strictly cross-monotonic mechanism corresponding to a
cost-sharing function g and satisfying VP, CS, and NPT. Further, suppose that the
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Fig. 1. The set disjointness problem.
mechanism must be computed in a network in which a link (or set of links) l is a cut
and there are (|P|) users on each side of l. Then, any deterministic or randomized
algorithm to compute Mg must send (|P|) bits across l in the worst case.
Proof. For simplicity, assume that the network consists of two nodes A and B con-
nected by one link l and that there are r= |P|=2 users at each of the two nodes.
(The proof of the more general case is identical.) Arbitrarily order the users at each
node. We can now call the users a1; a2; : : : ; ar and b1; b2; : : : ; br . Because the mecha-
nism Mg is strictly cross-monotonic, we can Bnd a real value d¿0 such that, for all
S ⊂P; i∈ S; j =∈ S,
gi(S ∪ {j}) ¡ gi(S)− d:
For each user i∈P, we will deBne two possible utility values tLi and tHi as follows:
• First, the values for a1 and b1 are
tHa1 = ga1 ({a1; b1}); tLa1 = tHa1 − d;
tHb1 = gb1 ({a1; b1}); tLb1 = tHb1 − d:
• Similarly, the values for ak and bk are
tHak = gak ({a1; a2; : : : ; ak ; b1; b2; : : : ; bk}); tLak = tHak − d;
tHbk = gbk ({a1; a2; : : : ; ak ; b1; b2; : : : ; bk}); tLbk = tHbk − d:
Now, we show how to reduce from the set disjointness problem to the mechanism
Mg. Node A gets a subset S1⊆{1; : : : ; r} and constructs a utility vector u for the users
at A, deBned by
∀i ∈ S1 uai = tHai ;
∀i =∈ S1 uai = tLai :
Similarly, node B is given set S2 and constructs a utility vector v for the users at B,
deBned by
∀i ∈ S2 vbi = tHbi ;
∀i =∈ S2 vbi = tLbi :
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They now run mechanism Mg on input (u; v) and check whether the receiver set
Rg(u; v) is empty.
Claim. Rg(u; v) is empty iA S1 and S2 are disjoint.
Proof of claim. To show the “if” direction, we can simulate the iterative algorithm
to compute the receiver set. We start with R=P. Then, because S1 and S2 are dis-
joint, either r =∈ S1 or r =∈ S2. Assume, without loss of generality, that r =∈ S1. Now,
uar = t
L
ar¡gar (R), and hence ar must drop out of the receiver set R. But now, because
of strict cross-monotonicity, it follows that gbr (P−{ar})¿gbr (P) = tHbr , and so br must
also drop out of the receiver set. Repeating this argument for r − 1; r − 2; : : : ; 1, we
can show that the receiver set must be empty.
To show the “only if” direction, assume that i∈ S1 ∩ S2. Then, let T={a1; : : : ; ai; b1;
: : : ; bi}. uai = tHai =gai(T ), and vai = tHbi =gbi(T ). Further, for all j¡i, it follows from
strict cross-monotonicity that gaj (T )¡t
L
aj6uaj , and gbj (T )¡t
L
bj6vbj . Thus, the
receiver set Rg(u; v)⊇T , and hence it is nonempty.
Theorem 1 follows from this claim and the communication complexity of set
disjointness.
2.1. Strictly subadditive cost functions
In this section, we show that, for a class of submodular cost functions, SH (which
is perhaps the most compelling mechanism from an economic point of view) is strictly
cross-monotonic and hence has poor network complexity.
Theorem 1 provides a su3cient condition, strict cross-monotonicity, for a mechanism
to have poor network complexity. However, for some submodular cost functions, it is
possible that no mechanism satisBes this condition: If the costs are additive, i.e., if the
cost of serving a set S is exactly the sum of the costs of serving each of its members
individually, then there is a unique mechanism satisfying the basic properties. This
mechanism is deBned by
R(u) = {i | ui ¿ C({i})};
xi(u) = C({i}) if i ∈ R(u); and xi(u) = 0 otherwise:
This mechanism is very easy to compute, either centrally or in a distributed manner,
because there is no interaction among the users’ utilities; in essence, we have |P|
independent local computations to perform.
We need to exclude these trivial cost functions in order to prove general lower
bounds for a class of submodular functions. This leads us to consider submodular cost
functions that are strictly subadditive:
∀S ⊆ P; S = ∅; ∀i ∈ P; C(S ∪ {i}) ¡ C(S) + C({i}):
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For a given cost function C, there may be many g={gi} for which the corresponding
mechanism Mg satisBes the basic properties NPT, VP, CS, and SYM. However, Moulin
and Shenker [23,24] have shown that, for any given submodular cost function, the
cross-monotonic mechanism that minimizes the worst-case e3ciency loss is SH. This
is a cross-monotonic cost-sharing mechanism corresponding to a function gSH , deBned
by
∀S ⊆ P ∀i ∈ S; gSHi (S) =
∑
R⊆S−{i}
|R|!(|S| − |R| − 1)!
|S|! [C(R ∪ {i})− C(R)]:
(1)
The SH mechanism is therefore a natural mechanism to choose for submodular cost
sharing. The following lemma shows that this mechanism has poor network complexity.
Lemma 1. SH for a strictly subadditive cost function is strictly cross-monotonic.
Proof. We need to show that, for all sets S, for all i∈ S; j =∈ S, gSHi (S ∪{j})¡gSHi (S).
The proof follows directly from the deBnition of gSHi (S) in Eq. (1). We use MCi(R)
to denote [C(R∪{i})−C(R)], the marginal costs of serving i in set R. Consider a set
S ⊆P − {j} and a user i∈ S. Let r= |R|; s= |S|.
gSHi (S ∪ {j}) =
∑
R⊆S∪{j}−{i}
r!(s− r)!
(s+ 1)!
MCi(R)
=
∑
R⊆S−{i}
[
r!(s− r)!
(s+1)!
MCi(R)+
(r+1)!(s− r−1)!
(s+1)!
MCi(R∪{j})
]
=
∑
R⊆S−{i}
r!(s− r − 1)!
s!
[
s− r
s+ 1
MCi(R) +
r + 1
s+ 1
MCi(R ∪ {j})
]
:
(2)
It follows from submodularity of costs that, for all R, MCi(R∪{j})6MCi(R). Further,
strict subadditivity implies that, for R=∅, MCi(R∪{j})¡MCi(R). Thus, Eq. (2) yields
gSHi (S ∪ {j}) ¡
∑
R⊆S−{i}
r!(s− r − 1)!
s!
MCi(R);
gSHi (S ∪ {j}) ¡ gSHi (S):
Corollary 1. For a strictly subadditive cost function, any algorithm (deterministic
or randomized) that computes the SH mechanism in a network must communicate
(|P|) bits across any cut that has ((|P|) users on each side of the cut.
Note that the network may consist of a root node s with no resident users, a node
A with |P|=2 resident users, another node B with |P|=2 resident users, a link from s
to A, and a path from A to B consisting of |N | − 3 nodes, each with no resident users.
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Each link in the path from A to B is a cut with ((|P|) users on each side, and thus
(|P|) bits must be sent across linearly many links. In what follows, we call these the
path instances.
2.2. Multicast cost sharing
We now return to the special case of multicast cost sharing. Recall that the cost
function associated with an instance of the multicast cost-sharing problem is determined
by the structure of the universal multicast tree T , the link costs, and the locations of
the users in the tree; so the cost C(S) of serving user set S ⊆P is ∑l∈T (S) c(l), where
T (S) is the smallest subtree of T that includes all nodes at which users in S reside. It
is not hard to show that there are many instances that give rise to strictly subadditive
functions C. In fact, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Consider any instance of multicast cost sharing in which, for every two
potential receivers i and j, there exists a link l ∈ T ({i})∩T ({j}) such that c(l)¿0.
The cost function associated with this instance is strictly subadditive.
Proof. Given S ⊆P − i, pick any j∈ S. Let l be any link in T ({j})∩T ({i}) with
c(l)¿0. Then, C(S ∪{i})6C(S) + C({i})− c(l)¡C(S) + C({i}).
For example, whenever the source of the multicast has only one link from it, and
this link has nonzero cost, the associated cost function is strictly subadditive. One such
family of instances (parametrized by p= |P|) is shown in Fig. 2. There are three nodes,
s, A, and B, and p users. There are (p=2) users at each of B and A, with utilities
u1; u2; : : : ; up=2 and v1; v2; : : : ; vp=2, respectively. The link l1 between s and A costs C,
while the link l2 between A and B is free (has 0 cost).
It follows immediately from Corollary 1 that the Shapley-value mechanism for this
family of trees requires (|P|) bits of communication across linearly many links. In
addition, we now show that any mechanism that satisBes the basic properties, such as
EG, must be identical to the SH mechanism on instances of the type shown in Fig. 2;
thus, the lower bound extends to all such mechanisms.
Fig. 2. Multicast tree with strictly subadditive costs.
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Lemma 3. Consider multicast cost-sharing instances of the type shown in Fig. 2. Let
Mg be a cross-monotonic cost-sharing mechanism that satis;es SYM, corresponding
to a cost-sharing function g={gi}. Then, g (and Mg) are completely determined on
these instances by
∀S ⊆ P;∀i ∈ S; gi(S) = C|S| :
Proof. For any receiver set S, if the utility values of all users in S are increased to
some su3ciently large value, the receiver set will still be S. Because the mechanism
satisBes SYM, this implies that gi(S)=gj(S) for any pair i; j in this set. The budget-
balance requirement then forces gi(S)=C=|S| for all i in S.
It follows from Lemma 3 that any such mechanism must be strictly cross-monotonic
on this family of instances. Thus, Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 imply the following lower
bound for multicast cost sharing. The worst-case instances include the path instances
deBned in Section 2.1, with cost C on the link from s to A and cost 0 on all the
other links; these instances are identical to the ones in Fig. 2, except that they contain
a zero-cost path of length |N | − 2 from A to B instead of a single zero-cost link.
Theorem 2. Any distributed algorithm, deterministic or randomized, that exactly
computes a budget-balanced, GSP multicast cost-sharing mechanism that satis;es the
four basic properties must send (|P|) bits over linearly many links in the worst
case.
Note that this lower bound applies to the EG mechanism for multicast cost-sharing
cited in Section 1.
3. Network complexity of approximately budget-balanced mechanisms
In view of the lower bounds presented in Section 2, it is natural to ask whether
one can approximate a budget-balanced, GSP mechanism in a communication-e3cient
manner. In this case, we do not have a clean analogue of Corollary 1, because cross-
monotonic cost functions no longer characterize the class of feasible mechanisms. How-
ever, for the special case of multicast cost sharing, we can still prove a result similar
to Theorem 2 that provides a lower bound on the network complexity of approximately
budget-balanced, GSP mechanisms.
First, we recall the deBnition of an “approximately budget-balanced” mechanism. As
explained at length in, e.g., [25,2], one cannot deBne an approximation of a cost-sharing
mechanism (; x) simply as a pair (′; x′) such that ′ and x′ approximate  and x,
respectively, as functions. Such an approach may destroy the game-theoretic properties
of (; x), e.g., the resulting “mechanism” (′; x′) may not be strategyproof! For our
purposes in this section, a )-approximately budget-balanced mechanism, where )¿1
is a constant, is a mechanism (; x) with the following properties: VP, NPT, CS, SYM,
J. Feigenbaum et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 304 (2003) 215–236 229
and
∀c(·); T (P); and u : (1=)) · c(T (R(u)))6 ∑
i∈R(u)
xi(u)6 ) · c(T (R(u))):
An approximation to a speciBc budget-balanced mechanism such as SH or EG would
have to satisfy at least one additional (nonstrategic) condition. For example, because
SH is the GSP, budget-balanced mechanism that minimizes worst-case e3ciency loss,
an approximation to SH would have to come within a constant factor of SH’s e3ciency
loss in the worst case.
We extend the lower-bound technique of the previous section so that it applies to
)-approximately budget-balanced mechanisms, when ) is upper-bounded away from√
2, i.e., when )6
√
2−*, for some Bxed *¿0. As before, we want to reduce from the
set-disjointness problem where node A has a set S1⊆{1; 2; : : : ; r}, node B has another
set S2⊆{1; 2; : : : ; r}, and one must determine whether the sets S1 and S2 are disjoint.
We again construct the multicast tree shown in Fig. 2 with (p=2) users at each of B
and A, with utilities u1; u2; : : : ; up=2 and v1; v2; : : : ; vp=2, respectively.
We Brst prove some basic lemmas about GSP mechanisms for this multicast cost
sharing problem.
Lemma 4. Let M be a )-approximately budget-balanced mechanism for the multicast
cost-sharing problem in Fig. 2 that satis;es GSP. Then, if  is a utility pro;le of
the p users such that
∃h¿ 1 such that ∀i ∈ {1; 2; : : : ; h} i ¿ )C=h
then the receiver set R() speci;ed by this mechanism is non-empty.
Proof. Let  be such a utility proBle, and consider any value of h for which the
given condition holds. Let cs be the bound for which the CS condition holds, i.e., if
i¿cs⇒ i∈R(). Let S={1; 2; : : : ; h}. DeBne a utility proBle S by
Si = cs ∀i ∈ S;
Si = i ∀i =∈ S:
By the CS condition, S ⊆R(S). Further, by the SYM condition, we must have
∀i; j∈ S, xi(S) = xj(S). Further, because the NPT condition implies that xi(S)¿0,
for all i =∈ S, and the approximate budget-balance condition requires that the revenue
be bounded by )C, we must have xi(S)6)C=h, for all i∈ S.
It follows that ∀i∈ S, xi(S)¡i. Now suppose that R() is empty. Then, at utility
proBle , the coalition S could strategize to report a utility proBle S ; then, for each
i∈ S, i would receive the transmission and pay less than i for it. This would constitute
a successful group strategy, which contradicts the assumption that M is GSP.
Lemma 5. Let M be a )-approximately budget-balanced mechanism for the multicast
cost-sharing problem in Fig. 2 that satis;es GSP. Then, if  is a utility pro;le such
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that
1 ¿ 2 ¿ · · ·¿ p and
@h¿ 1 such that h ¿ C=()h)
then the receiver set R() speci;ed by this mechanism is empty.
Proof. Let  be such a utility proBle, and let S=R(). Suppose that S = ∅. Let
h= max{i|i∈ S}, which implies that ∀i∈ S; i¿h. By the conditions of the lemma,
h¡C=()h); thus, the approximate budget-balance condition combined with VP im-
plies that ∃j∈ S such that xj()¿xh(). It then follows that j¿h. (If j=h, then
by SYM we would have xj()=xh().)
Now, deBne the utility proBle ′ by
′h = j;
′i = i ∀i = h:
If h =∈R(′), then at utility proBle ′, h could strategize to report h and get trans-
mission with payment xh(); this would be a successful strategy because xh()¡xj()
6 j=′h. Mechanism M is strategyproof, so we must have h∈R(′). Further, we must
also have xh(′)=xh() for the same reason: If xh(′)¿xh(), then h could strategize
at ′, and, if xh()¿xh(′), then h could strategize at .
Now, by applying the SYM condition at ′, we must have j∈R(′) and xj(′)=
xh(′). This implies that xj(′)=xh()¡xj(). But now, h and j could collude and
strategize at  to report ′; this strictly increases j’s welfare (as her payment is strictly
reduced), and leaves h’s welfare unchanged, and hence it would be a successful group
strategy. This contradicts the fact that M satisBes GSP.
The ordering condition 1¿2¿ · · ·¿p in Lemma 5 is only included for simplicity
of the exposition; we can always relabel the agents such that it holds.
Theorem 3. Any distributed algorithm, deterministic or randomized, that computes
a )-approximately budget-balanced, GSP multicast cost-sharing mechanism, where
)6
√
2 − * for some ;xed *¿0, must send (log |P|= log )) bits of communication
over linearly many links in the worst case.
Proof. It is more convenient to work with an alternative representation of the input
utility vectors. We use only a restricted set of the possible utility vectors u and v for
the users located at nodes B and A, respectively, where (u; v) satisBes the following
conditions:
• Let -=3() + .)2=(2 − () + .)2), where .¿0 is an arbitrarily small constant only
required to make the inequalities strict. Restrict the set of allowable utilities to
T={0; t-;1; : : : ; t-; r}, where
t-;i =
() + .)C
2-i+1
:
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• Each of u and v is (internally) sorted, i.e., i¡j⇒ ui¿uj and vi¿vj. There is no
restriction on the relationship between ui and vj.
Consider node B. DeBne nB(q) to be the number of users at node B who have
utility at least q. Let y=(y1; y2; : : : ; yr), where yi=nB(t-; i). Similarly, let nA(q) be the
number of users at A with utility at least q; let z=(z1; z2; : : : ; zr), where zi=nA(t-; i).
For this class of utility proBles, there is a one-to-one mapping between values of
u and y. Because u is sorted, the monotonically decreasing function nB(·) completely
deBnes the utility vector; u1 must be the largest q for which nB(q)¿0, and so on.
Furthermore, by deBnition, there is a unique y for any u. A similar correspondence
holds for v and z.
We Brst prove a useful lemma about approximately budget-balanced mechanisms on
this class of instances.
Lemma 6. Let M be a )-approximately budget-balanced mechanism for the multi-
cast cost-sharing problem in Fig. 2 that satis;es GSP. Let vectors y, z be de;ned
corresponding to the utility pro;les u and v, as described above. Then, M satis;es
the following two properties:
(i) If there is an i such that (yi + zi)¿2-i+1, then mechanism M will compute a
non-empty receiver set on this instance.
(ii) If for all i we have (yi + zi)6(3-i + -i+1), then mechanism M will compute an
empty receiver set on this instance.
Proof. (i) Observe that with a suitable ordering of the players, the conditions of
Lemma 4 are satisBed if (yi + zi)¿2-i+1.
(ii) Assume that the receiver set is nonempty and that the conditions of Lemma 5
do not apply due to the presence of some h such that h · h¿C=), where  is the
utility proBle of P sorted in decreasing order.
Let h= t-; k for some k. Since h6yk + zk , we note that h ·h6(yk + zk)t-; k6(3-k +
-k+1)t-; k=C=() + .). This violates the assumption that h · h¿C=).
We now use Lemma 6 to provide a reduction from the set disjointness problem as
follows. Recall that node A has a set S1⊆{1; 2; : : : ; r} and node B has another set
S2⊆{1; 2; : : : ; r}. We must make sure that, if S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, there is a set of receivers
who can share )C, and, if S1 ∩ S2=∅, there is no set of receivers who can share even
C=). For this, we construct the vectors y and z using the rules:
yi = -i+1 if i ∈ S2;
yi = -i otherwise;
zi = -i+1 if i ∈ S1;
zi = -i otherwise:
These are valid input vectors, because yi6yi+1 and similarly for z. If i∈ S1 ∩ S2,
then yi + zi¿2-i+1, and so there is transmission. If S1 and S2 are disjoint, then, for
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all i,
yi + zi ¡ -i + -i+1 + 2 ¡ 3-i + -i+1;
where the 2 arises because of the ceiling terms.
This means that, in the target instance
(yi + zi)t-;i ¡
C
)
and consequently there is no transmission.
Thus, we can use this )-approximate mechanism to solve the set-disjointness prob-
lem, and this implies that the mechanism must use (r) bits of communication, where
r = (
(
logp
log -
)
= (
(
logp
2 log() + .)− log(2− () + .)2)
)
:
If we require ) to be upper-bounded away from
√
2, then the right-hand side is
((logp= log )). Thus, the statement of the theorem follows.
We note that this lower bound applies to the approximate mechanisms described
in [2,17]. The mechanisms SF and SSF described in [2] provide the best known cor-
responding upper bound: They require (h · log plog ) ) utility values to be communicated
on each link to achieve )-approximate budget balance, where h is the height of the
multicast tree T (P).
4. An impossibility result for approximate budget-balance and approximate e)ciency
As stated in Section 1, it is a classical result in game theory that no strategyproof
cost-sharing mechanism can be both budget-balanced and e3cient [12,29]. We now
consider whether this fundamental impossibility result holds when the budget-balance
and e3ciency considerations are replaced by their approximate counterparts. In this
section, we do not assume that the cost-sharing mechanisms have the SYM property; the
impossibility result that we present here does not require this assumption. Furthermore,
this result only requires the mechanism to be strategyproof, not GSP as in Section 3.
We Brst review the deBnition of the MC mechanism, which was shown by Moulin
and Shenker [24] to be the only e3cient mechanism that satisBes VP, NPT, and CS.
Given an input utility proBle u, the MC receiver set is the unique largest e>cient set
of users. To compute it, as shown in [7], one recursively computes the welfare (also
known as net worth or e>ciency) of each node -∈N :
W (-) =

 ∑
2 ∈ Ch(-)
W (2) ¿ 0
W (2)

− c(l) + ∑
i∈Res(-)
ui;
where Ch(-) is the set of children of - in the tree, Res(-) is the set of users resident
at -, and c(l) is the cost of the link connecting - to its parent node. Then, the largest
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e3cient set R(u) is the set of all users i such that every node on the path from i to
the root s has non-negative welfare. The total e>ciency is NW(R(u))=W (s).
Another way to view this is as follows: The algorithm partitions the universal tree
T (P) into a forest F(u)={T1(u); T2(u); : : : ; Tk(u)}. A link from T (P) is included in
the forest if and only if the child node has nonnegative welfare. R(u) is then the set
of users at nodes in the subtree T1(u) containing the root.
Once F(u) has been computed, for each user i, deBne X (i; u) to be the node with
minimum welfare value in the path from i to its root in its partition. Then, the cost
share xi(u) of user i is deBned as
xi(u) = max(0; ui −W (X (i; u))) ∀i ∈ R(u);
xi(u) = 0 ∀i =∈ R(u):
If multiple nodes on the path have the same welfare value, we let X (i; u) be the one
nearest to i.
By a 2-approximately e>cient mechanism, where 0¡2¡1, we mean one that always
achieves total e3ciency that is at least 2 times the total e3ciency achieved by MC.
We can ask whether there is any strategyproof mechanism that satisBes the basic
requirements of NPT, VP, and CS and is both approximately e3cient and approximately
budget-balanced. We now show that this is impossible, using the following approach:
We construct a family of multicast trees and utility proBles for which any approximately
e3cient mechanism must transmit to all users. We show that the strategyproofness
condition and the VP condition together place an upper bound on the revenue collected
in these instances. This upper bound is less than that required for even approximate
budget balance, and hence we have our negative result.
Consider the tree in Fig. 3. There are p users, each with utility C=p resident at a
node A that is separated from the root node by a link of cost ((p− 1)C=p) + .. It is
easy to see that this instance of multicast cost-sharing displays the following properties.
Property 1. Any 2-approximately e>cient mechanism must transmit to all p users
if 0¡.¡C=p.
Fig. 3. An example of a multicast tree that fails to achieve approximate e3ciency and approximate budget-
balance.
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Property 2. Any 2-approximately e>cient mechanism must transmit to all p users
even if one user, say i, lowers his utility to .+ *, for any ., * ¿ 0.
Property 3. Any 2-approximately e>cient, strategyproof mechanism that satis;es
VP assigns to each user a cost share of at most ..
If the cost share xi(u) were greater than ., the user i could strategize by claiming
that his utility was vi=. + *¡xi(u). By VP and the requirement of 2-approximate
e3ciency, the mechanism would need to include user i and assign him a cost share
xi(u|ivi)6vi¡xi(u), which would imply a violation of strategyproofness.
Therefore, the revenue collected by a strategyproof mechanism that achieves
2-approximate e3ciency is bounded from above by p..
Property 4. A 2-approximately e>cient, strategyproof mechanism cannot be )-
approximately budget-balanced if .¡(C(p− 1))=(p()p− 1)).
In summary, we have:
Theorem 4. A strategyproof mechanism for multicast cost sharing that satis;es the
basic requirements of NPT, VP, and CS cannot achieve both 2-approximate e>ciency
and )-approximate budget-balance for any pair of constants ) and 2.
5. Conclusions and open problems
As we explained in Section 1, one central challenge in the study of algorithmic
mechanism design is the search for hard problems. A problem may be considered to
be a “canonical hard problem” if it cannot be solved in a manner that satisBes both
the incentive-compatibility and the computational-tractability requirements but becomes
easy if one of these two requirements is dropped. Our results show that, under the ba-
sic requirements of NPT, VP, CS, and SYM, exact computation of budget-balanced
multicast cost shares is such a problem. In this context, a problem is considered com-
putationally tractable if it can be solved by a distributed algorithm with low network
complexity; a solution is considered incentive compatible if it is GSP. Theorem 2 shows
that the problem is hard if both requirements are to be satisBed simultaneously. If the
computational-tractability requirement is dropped, the problem is easy: Just use the SH
mechanism and compute it using the natural (centralized) polynomial-time algorithm
explained in Section 2 above. If the incentive-compatibility requirement is dropped,
it is easy as well: Just do one bottom-up pass of T (P), computing U=
∑
i∈P ui and
C=
∑
l∈L c(l). If C¿U , no one receives the transmission, and the mechanism does
one top-down pass to inform all members of P that this is the outcome; if C6U ,
everyone receives the transmission, and the mechanism does one top-down pass to
communicate the cost share (ui · C)=U to user i, for all i∈P.
The most important general direction for future work is the search for more good
distributed algorithmic mechanisms and for more canonical hard problems. Additional
general open questions in DAMD can be found in [8].
J. Feigenbaum et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 304 (2003) 215–236 235
More speciBcally, we ask whether the lower bound in Section 3 is tight. The “scaled
step-function” (SSF) mechanism considered in [2] gives some hope that it is, but
the bounds on budget-imbalance and e3ciency-loss for SSF are not constant factors.
Another interesting open question is to ask if the communication lower bounds extend
to strategyproof (but not necessarily group-strategyproof) budget-balanced mechanisms.
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